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INTER-CULTURAL EXPERTISE: SOLDIERS AND HISTORIANS 
DONALD ABENHEIM 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
 
INTRODUCTION: STRATEGY IS OUT, ANTHROPOLOGY IS IN  
The historian should be a partner to the soldier in the attempt better to understand culture 
as a feature of present-day military service. To do so, however, such historians must also be 
experts in the culture of soldiers — a different kind of inter-cultural expertise that must underlie 
any serious effort to bring the nuances of cultural study and understanding to the practice of 
soldiering. The study of the past faces notable limits in the higher aspects of security, defense and 
war that inhere in the culture of soldiers as well as the regard (or rather disregard) for the past in 
our post-modern society, especially in the United States. These professional limits and the 
challenges to what one might call an understanding of inter-cultural expertise at the strategic level 
form the subjects for the next forty minutes. (The question at hand also has implications for 
democratic civil military relations, a subject that remains at the heart of these seminars, now in 
their tenth year — something historical in its own right. Might I also add that what follows is a 
distillate of my own more than thirty years’ experience in this matter as an historian in university 
think-tanks and the US government.)  
 
OVERVIEW  
The present talk offers: a.) a brief introduction to the role of historical study in inter-
cultural expertise in the record of the US and German armed forces; b.) a reflection on the 
historian’s calling and the habits of the mind and character that strike me as central to expertise 
about one’s own culture and the cultures of others; c.) a warning of the danger that arises when, 
as now, the history of war is falsely conceived and, thus deformed, becomes a weapon in what in 
the United States are called “cultural wars.” The ensuing polarization of US domestic politics 
obscures and eschews inter-cultural expertise, to say nothing of the harm it does to the effective 
making of strategy more generally. In other words, the loudest tones in the current debate 
disserve all varieties of inter-cultural expertise.  
 
TWO BAD EXAMPLES  
At the outset, I offer two polemical examples of the limits of history and inter-cultural 
expertise in the form of two contemporary US figures who make generalizations about the 
military past of central Europe and the connections of this past to the present. These tendentious 
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pronouncements betray to me, at least, a deficient degree of inter-cultural expertise. The first is 
contained in a 25 October 2007 opinion article in the New York Times — also in the IHT — by 
Roger Cohen. He pits the existing burden-sharing calls in NATO from the Dutch, British and 
Australians against the so-called national caveats and limitations for ISAF ( well known to an 
audience of this kind…) and especially for a greater German (and French and Spanish) combat 
role against the Taliban in the southeast of Afghanistan, and he comes up with a peculiar wish:  
 
Remember the Wehrmacht? It was a formidable fighting force. The modern 
German Army, the Bundeswehr is also very effective. Thing is, it is reluctant to 
fight or even to place itself in danger. Given history, that may seem just fine. The 
US helped to frame the institutions of today’s Germany precisely to guarantee 
peace over war. But in AFG, where 3200 German troops serve in a hard pressed 
NATO force, a touch of “Bundesmacht” would be welcome. NYT, 25 October 
2007, p. A 27  
 
A similar flourish of inadequate inter-cultural expertise about the past comes from movie-
land. Since the summer of this year, one has the strange case of Tom Cruise’s discovery of Claus 
Schenk von Stauffenberg. Such is part of the general recent Hollywood romance with the new 
Berlin, but also what I believe in my own experience to have been a deliberate attempt by 
Scientologists to target the German armed forces for ideological reasons. The German MOD 
initially turned down this man’s request (rightfully, I might add) to film in the former HQ of the 
Ersatzheer, in the Bendlerblock, next to the present-day German MOD. Here popular culture of a 
kind collides with the central European culture of soldiers to form a gross disservice to the serious 
business of soldiering versus the Tinseltown make-believe version of the soldier in the Third 
Reich joined with the Agit-prop of L. Ron Hubbard’s kook army (with its rather different 
uniforms).  
These examples call into question whether leading figures in US elite political culture 
(i.e. opinion editors of the New York Times) or US popular culture are fundamentally capable of 
a serious appreciation of the history of central Europe, its culture or more properly its political 
and strategic cultures. This question is germane to the matter of the cultures of the Middle East 
and Southwest Asia, for if my charges (student-officers who must embody and advance the U.S. 
military’s intellectual and scholarly aspect) are incapable of understanding the politics, society, 
and culture of Europe, then the prospects for the more immediately urgent assignments are 
doubly problematic. In this connection, I do not want to fall into the trap of expatriate snobbery 
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on foreign territory, in that I mock my ill-informed countrymen in front of you. Such a thing is 
too facile, and does nothing to resolve the festering problem. On the contrary, I appeal to the high 
standards given to me by my European teachers in my long struggle to understand the role of 
culture in politics in modern times and the culture of soldiers — that is, in my own attempt to 
become an inter-cultural expert. 
 
THE US EXPERIENCE IN SHORT, 1940 UNTIL NOW  
For this veteran historian in public service and military educator, the post-2004 call for 
inter-cultural expertise in military operations also can provoke a shrug of exhaustion amid the 
protracted campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the persistence of inter-cultural in-expertise 
continues to complicate the discourse and, thus, the prospects for sustainable resolutions . This 
fatigue becomes even more profound when one considers the record since the 1950s as concerns 
the role of the sciences, the humanities and the arts in the higher aspects of war, the making of 
strategy and the soldierly profession in the United States. From the eclipse, in the first atomic 
clouds of the 1940s, of such traditional figures in the cultural pantheon of soldiers as Henri de 
Jomini, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Billy Mitchell, to the rise of the military manager as business-
school graduate and the nuclear scientist and the systems analyst as arbiters of war and peace, the 
mid-century strategic debate sought to replace the archaic notions of soldiering before The Bomb 
with newer ideas more suited to a strategic environment that had to be without precedent, granted 
the pure mega-tonnage at stake. That is, war could wrongly be said to be a union of physics, 
management theory and economics. This triumvirate predominated until the late 1960s, when the 
advent of Mao’s protracted war unsettled the whole arrangement. The discomfiture of the military 
manager/defense manger and economist in the Vietnam debacle then saw the revival of the 
historian as partner to the strategist in the return of strategic idealism in the mid-1970s, evident in 
the reform of curriculum in the US Naval War College with the addition of the humanities, as 
well as in the so-called Clausewitz renaissance associated with the re-invention of doctrine (FM 
100-5) in the US Army of the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
 
DEAD END OF THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND INTER CULTURAL 
EXPERTISE  
The success in combat in the 1990–91 Gulf War led to an over-optimistic return to the 
management sciences as the source of all strategic wisdom, though this time, the emphasis fell 
less on “whiz kids” ca. 1961 than on computer and communications wizardry of our rising digital 
age. Now, the nuclear strategist found himself consigned to the dustbin of defense-intellectual 
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fashion, as the so-called revolution in military affairs declared the atom-splitters to be old-
fashioned and, worse, wholly irrelevant to strategic situation that only the Nintendo-fluent 
generations could adequately grasp. A great deal of nonsense based loosely on the past — or a 
misreading of it — accumulated around this idea until the summer of 2003 when the campaign in 
Iraq stumbled into the insurgency.  
Since then, the failure of this stillborn revolution in the fight against the Jihadists — and 
the disgrace of the RMA’s proponents in the bloody back streets of Baghdad and in the mountains 
of Afghanistan — has been startling to some, but entirely expected by others more at home in the 
history of war and in the roles of society and culture in warfare. And now the humanities and 
social sciences have once again achieved a kind of boom phase. Indeed, one sees the rise of the 
anthropologist-at-arms as the partner to the counterinsurgency specialist and the nation-builder. 
This development marks a kind of throwback to the late 19th century as exemplified in the British 
experience in their empire of the late 19th and early 20th centuries — consider here such British 
luminaries as T.E. Lawrence and Getrude Bell. I do not wish to reflect on them as a model, per se, 
because I am a historian of central Europe, not of Edwardian Britain nor of its elites in 
universities and in the colonial armed forces. From my perspective, the careers of such historical 
figures exclude them from being a model for you and me or for the men and women we educate. 
But reflection on their lives in the context of their time might aid us better to understand their 
circumstances of service, and, as a result, our own, as well. That is, the political, social and 
intellectual world that produced Lawrence and Bell has little in common with the experience of 
my US student officers, and hence has limited utility in the 21st century. Such is the case, in part, 
because the brains of the US forces are oriented toward goals other than an understanding of 
culture and society in organized violence.  
In contrast to the armies of most European nations, the US forces have an enormous 
historical establishment — or what one might call a historical capability — that has a vast 
offerings in training, education and defense management somehow connected to the analysis, 
interpretation, and rendering into the realm of the symbolic of the past, described by others as 
history. Do look at the websites of the service centers for military history, especially that of the 
United States Army, the service that plainly has the most well developed program in this area. 
The overall impression even to me as a veteran of this system is astonishing, especially in 
comparison, say, with Germany and Austria in terms of size. But the number of personnel as well 
as the variety of their activities should not be the final determinant of the question before us. 
Quantity and quality remain two different categories. To what intellectual end within the goals of 
policy within a democracy does this effort successfully operate, and by what means?  
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In the US case, those expert in the past are principally engaged in the application or 
exploitation of the past for the formation of operational doctrine as well as for the maintenance of 
soldierly tradition, i.e. Sinnestiftung. I call this activity: die Verwertung der Vergangenheit. It 
entails a didactic application of the past on a huge scale and on a technocratic basis, in which the 
idea of culture, in a central European sense, has played scarcely any role at all. Consider in this 
connection the very job description of the US Army Chief of Military History, who “is 
responsible for ensuring the appropriate use of military history in the teaching of strategy, tactics, 
logistics, and administration” and whose “mission includes the requirement that military leaders 
at all levels be aware of the value of history in advancing military profession.” To put the matter 
another way: the institutional exploitation of the past for didactic purposes — often described as 
military history and disseminated as the inevitable “lessons learned” — serves the formation of 
pertinent systems of military doctrine and the cataloging of lessons of war on the operational or 
tactical levels. This practice has a glorious past that speaks to the culture of soldiers in my 
country. It also speaks to the limitations of this time-honored approach to the past for inter-
cultural expertise. The experts do not even ask the necessary questions of their subject or their 
material to achieve inter-cultural insights. Inter-cultural inquiry seldom enters into the basic 
analytical calculus. Cohen’s statement about the Wehrmacht in comparison to the Bundeswehr 
reflects this phenomenon. The admiration in the anglo-saxon world for the German soldier of the 
early 20th century inevitably fails to grasp the political and social world of such soldiers, that is, 
the central European culture of the soldier with which many of you are well familiar.  
This problematic heritage stands in contrast to the metaphysics of Carl von Clausewitz 
and, in my opinion, more reflects the pseudo-scientific approach of Henri de Jomini and his many 
acolytes as it endures into the present in endless systems of formalistic schemas of war. This 
peculiar instrumentalization of the past began with the foundation of West Point in 1802 on the 
basis of a French school of applied military engineering and continued through to the foundation 
of the US Naval War College in 1890, of the US Army War College in 1901 and of the Industrial 
College of the US Army in 1924 — all institutions that accord pride of place to applied sciences 
or subjects that can be dressed as such. The US-sponsored recycling of German general staff 
officers from the prison camp to NATO’s entryway in the late 1940s was guided by a similar 
practical concern. The “lessons learned” by Wehrmacht general staff officers were abstracted in 
American minds from their political and social context and made into universal principles 
applicable in 1950s NATO, Europe or other fronts in the cold war.  
In the 1990s, this process — that is, the construction of ideal types based on so-called 
lessons from history — took a turn into the extreme amid the “revolution in military affairs,” 
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originally a Soviet idea popularized by Andrew Marshall, one of the original group at RAND in 
Santa Monica in the 1950s. The ensuing application of the legacy of railroads and rifles, and of 
armored vehicles and radios, to contemporary conflict had its origins in the middle and late 
1970s. This false dogma of technological progress as the dominant force of warfare represented a 
wrong-headed attempt to generalize about the role of technology in conflict, while seeking a kind 
of new paradigm for combat that would have the same persuasiveness as nuclear deterrence 
doctrine of the 1950s and 1960s. This idea also embodied an attempt to uphold the strategic 
idealism of the late 19th and early 20th century in the face of rapid political, social and economic 
change at the end of the 20th century. This dubious ideal then and now embodied a compact, self-
referential doctrine of the elite control over machine warfare and later over digitalized combat 
that sought to canalize or otherwise control the uncontrollable escalatory forces of imperialism, 
integral nationalism, technology, and racism.  
Such an idea and its application in practice also wished away or sought to make only 
incidental the question of culture and society in warfare, especially the culture and society of 
likely opponents once the Soviet Union collapsed. The failure of this dogma and its proponents 
(symbolized by the downfall of Donald Rumsfeld) in the face of irregular warfare as well as the 
respective traditions of organized violence in Middle Eastern and southwest Asian societies 
requires a full institutional as well as scholarly interpretation that has yet to unfold. But surely the 
technocratic system of lessons learned and best practices amid the selective exploitation of the 
past as an adjunct to management sciences has turned up a great big dud. Such a system is poorly 
suited to produce inter-culture expertise even if, in the past couple of years, the attempt has begun 
to remedy this problem amid the counter-insurgency doctrine put forward by General Petraeus 
while in command of US Army Training and Doctrine Command.  
Now, as someone who has been a member of this institution for nearly as long as my 
august colleague with four stars, I wish to register my doubts about certain fundamental 
philosophical habits of the mind in this system. The unbending emphasis on the primacy of tactics 
in union with the technological paradigm make the promotion of inter-cultural expertise more 
than passingly problematic for many of my students and other officers whom I have encountered 
in more than thirty years of government service.  
 
THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE AS CONTRAST  
Lest my critique above strike you as too negative or defeatist, the example of Oberst i.G. 
Hans-Meier Welcker, the first chief of the Military History Office (Militärgeschichtliches 
Forschungsamt der Bundeswehr) in the year 1957 until 1964, opens a different and more 
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suggestive perspective as concerns inter-cultural expertise and the culture of soldiers. Whereas 
Stauffenberg’s name may yet become a household word in various locales because of Hollywood, 
even in the Bundeswehr, Meier-Welcker is scarcely known save to those of us professionally 
associated with the MGFA or in the educational establishment of the Bundeswehr. Nonetheless, 
his legacy offers us a way forward to inter-cultural expertise that can contribute to the harmony 
between democracy and the professional soldier.  
Of primary importance to us here is the manner in which Meier-Welcker, a veteran of the 
Reichswehr and a general staff officer in the Wehrmacht (and a colleague of Stauffenberg), 
contributed to the eradication of the Nazi abuse of scholarship and to the democratic 
consolidation of West German democracy in the 1950s and the 1960s by the integration of the 
German soldier into the spirit and letter of the German Basic Law. He did so in an attempt to 
answer the question of whether a soldier and historian could learn from history in the wake of the 
experience of arms and the state from 1918 until 1945. His question formed but part of what 
presently came to be known as Innere Führung, in which civic education forms a significant part 
of this unifying ideal of constitutional imperatives and enlightened principles of leadership, 
command and morale.  
Innere Führung relies, in part, on historische Bildung, a process for which no comparable 
activity exists in the US forces. Historische Bildung forms a component of the Bildung of an 
officer or a soldier amid a life-long process. One seeks to answer the questions of the past and to 
shatter the vice grip of myths and legends. One does so with an ideologically neutral, scholarly 
reading of primary sources that adheres to the standards of academic research at the highest level. 
Historische Bildung also keeps in mind that past events unfolded as a consequence of cultural, 
political, social, economic, technical, legal and religious factors. As a result, the history of 
conflict, military institutions and soldiers becomes linked to greater historical and contemporary 
developments in politics, culture, economy and society. Thus Historische Bildung represents 
something very different from a catalog of lessons learned or a gallery of ancestors.  
This aspect of the soldier scholar in Innere Führung broke abruptly with past custom and 
tradition. Before 1945, the use of history-at-arms in the Prussian/German experience had been, in 
the first instance, to provide the dynastic elites with their claim to political and social privileges 
of the old regime. In the second instance, it furnished the military managerial elite of the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries with their claim to professional expertise in the art and science of war 
during the age of the machine and mass politics. To be precise, the interpretation of the history of 
war in the late 19th century lay in the hands of the Prussian-German general staff, whose emphasis 
on lessons learned as well as the formation of a compact, self-referential doctrine has been 
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handed down to the US armed forces of this day. Finally, the history of war, super-charged with 
the experience of the front fighter as well as integral nationalism and racism, became a means to 
instill a totalitarian, militarist ethos in the citizens of greater Germany.  
After receiving a doctorate at Tübingen in 1952, Meier-Welcker joined Ulrich de 
Maizière, one of the fathers of Innere Führung, in the Amt Blank in Bonn, the forerunner of the 
Ministry of Defense. The two had been educated together as general staff officers in 1937–39. 
Meier-Welcker led the small history section in the Ermekeilkaserne. He became head of the new 
MGFA in Langenau near Ulm in 1957 and built, in the years until his retirement in 1964, an 
intellectual bridge to the life of the mind according to the standards of universities in the FRG and 
beyond.  
Meier-Welcker had the following to say about the value of history in the culture of 
soldiers, and his ideas reveal a path to greater inter-cultural expertise through the study of the past 
that adheres to high scholarly standards: 
 
Our skepticism as concerns the educational possibilities via the study of 
history does not concern history itself, but rather concerns ourselves. It may be 
that history no longer can cause enthusiasm in us, that is, according to Goethe, 
the best that it can give us. If it can be said to have any value for education, … 
then such can only exist when it compels human beings to face themselves; to 
remind them of their potential and their limits, as well as to show them in their 
entanglement and dependency, but also to show them in their freedom. Where is 
such more possible than in the history of war? Surely one must reach the essence 
of the past events. Das Denken im Ganzen bleibt immer das Gegenstück zum 
Handeln im einzelnen.  
 
Surely if there exists a single idea before us that speaks to the contribution of the 
historian to inter-cultural expertise, it is this last sentence, which draws its inspiration for the 
world of German classicism. The message and meaning here further is wholly alien to the 
technocratic, lessons learned catalog mindset that characterizes — and limits — historical and 
inter-cultural understanding today. In my own experience as a promoter of inter-cultural expertise 
in the US forces, I have found a general institutionalized resistance to conceive of matters in the 
sense of the whole, in favor of an overemphasis on tactics and technology, all at the expense of 
inter-cultural expertise.  
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The accomplishment of Meier-Welcker and the men and women who have followed him 
in the last half century has been to establish a standard of intellectual excellence in historical 
research and education in the Bundeswehr in the face of some fairly major obstacles. This 
approach connects the historian in military service to German professional soldiers; it has also 
built a path  to the scholarly world and facilitated the democratic integration of armed forces in a 
Europe. Such labor has unfolded with adequate bureaucratic resources and with some 
controversy, especially about the question of the Wehrmacht in National Socialism with which 
you are familiar. To be sure, a younger generation of editorial writers and even younger screen 
idols know far too little of this issue, nor are they likely to learn.  
Meier-Welcker is a worthy heir to Hans Delbrueck and to Carl von Clausewitz in the 
manner in which the intellectual rigor of these men and their sense of the whole are exemplary for 
inter-cultural expertise in the 21st century. Put another way, if one embraces the best that 
historical scholarship has to offer as regards the link between war in the past to society, culture, 
economy, and politics, then one has made a step in the direction of education for inter cultural 
expertise. Historians who follow Meier-Welcker’s example can well be partners of the soldier in 
the quest for inter-cultural expertise.  
 
CONCLUSION: BEWARE THE TERRIBLE SIMPLIFIERS 
The story above points to an even greater question in my own country as concerns the 
culture of soldiers and their ability to deal with conflict of what is really a quite traditional kind, 
11 September 2001 notwithstanding. This question has profound implications for how the culture 
of soldiers is perverted by the institutional failure to engage the political, social, cultural and 
economic realities of such nations as Iraq and Afghanistan. However, one can pose this question 
to the cases of Mexico, North Africa, central Europe, Japan, Korea, Vietnam and elsewhere in the 
past record of the US soldier. I warn here especially against the tendency of certain journalistic 
terrible simplifiers and pied pipers to polarize analysis on these issues of politics, war and culture. 
The absence of a pluralistic foundation in society for the writing of history about contemporary 
conflict and the military past opens the gates to the seizure of soldierly honor and the martial 
tradition by figures who have no interest in our agenda here. Hence my reproach of Cruise for 
trying to put on the carmine-red collar patches stained with blood of a man like Stauffenberg. 
This episode reflects a more generalized and worrisome trend, a larger tendency in the public 
mind in which make believe and reality merge with disastrous effects. Certain writers about the 
past and present intend  a kind domestic political cold war in the United States and elsewhere as 
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part of what is called the long war. These men reflect the union of political and psychological 
forces in what Clausewitz so well described as the nature of war to seek its absolute form.  
The abuse of the catalog of lessons learned can degrade into the formation of legend and 
myth for partisan political purposes at the expense of democracy and military effectiveness on a 
constitutional basis. The German experience in the years 1890 until 1920 is duplicating itself in 
my country, at least as visible in the recent rather pathetic speech by General Ricardo Sanchez to 
a meeting of military reporters, whom this man blamed for the misfortunes in Iraq. That is, the 
neo-MacArthurian legends of “never again” digs deeper the domestic political trenches  in US 
partisan terrain  where the search is on for the guilty of all stripes. The history of the so-called 
long war is presently being written, in part, by such men as Victor Davis Hanson, Frederick 
Kagan, and Ralph Peters in a manner that is incompatible with democratic civil military relations. 
These men promote legends and myths especially with a tendentious interpretation of war in 
antiquity and nostalgia for the Second World War.  
All of this says more about political culture in the US and rather nothing about the 
political culture, culture at arms  and society of our opponents. These legends and myths, written 
by figures who pose as historians — but who are really partisan political figures, propagandists, 
and journalists — direct their anger and hatred against domestic political foes and against the US 
constitution and the US ideal of the citizen in uniform. The legends they promote are a result, in 
part, of the intellectual shortcomings and weaknesses of an official exploitation of the past of 
poor academic quality.  
The integration of soldiers and defense civilians  into multi-national organizations 
requires inter cultural expertise on a large scale. The example of central Europeans in the past 
fifty years somehow to have robbed nationalism at arms of  its capacity to cause total war reflects 
the success of inter cultural expertise of a kind of European cosmopolitanism. This virtue must be 
extended beyond the narrow frontiers of what was once called the Article VI area of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. (In saying this, I am well aware that some of you are not in NATO and shall not 
be, but we are here in the spirit of PfP and reference to the treaty geographical limits is 
obligatory.) Inter-cultural expertise can thus be seen, despite the shortfalls of such startling 
ignorance as that of Cohen and Cruise, as being part of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
that is clause on the promotion of democracy.  
Inter-cultural expertise in the hands of soldiers can also be the means, within the limits of 
the task, to extend values of security, peace, and freedom to areas that have traditionally been 
devoid of same. Such inter-cultural expertise can also be fostered by many disciplines in aid of 
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security and defense education for reform. The historian can and should do his or her fair share in 
this task, while we all should turn our backs on propaganda masquerading as soldierly virtue.  
 
 
 
